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The Economics of;.·Information·, Market Structure, 
and Pricfng in the Securitf es Industry . · 
by William E. Mitchell and· Robert L. Sorensen 
I. Introduction 
·Traditional microeconomic theory explains the process by which 
markets determine prices, output, and product variety under the simpl ffyi.ng 
. . 
assumption that all market participa11ts. possess perfect (costless) 
inJormatio1_1. While it is recognized that,· in fact, fnfonnation is 
neither perfect nor costless, ft 1 s. commonly assumed that the other 
proper-ti es of the model do not depend in any important way on this 
condition. This model predicts that there will be a single _market price 
for identical goods in a perfectly competitive market~ 
Beginning with the seminal article by Stigler (1961}, a theoretical 
literature began to energe in the 1970s concerning ·the economics of market 
information, which is the study of the microeconomics of producing, 
obtaining, and using infonnation about the potential terms of trade in 
a market context. Economics of information models seek to provide 
explanations of the adjustment to equilibrium that are lacking in 
traditional models. Hirs,hl eifer (1973) provides a good description 
of this field of study: In these models, it is assumed that buyers 
and sellers are uncertain about the market terms of trade of price and 
quality characteristics of goods and services. They are assumed.to have 
perfect information about their own resources and opportunities~ bu-t: 
are _uncertain (imperfectly informed) about the demand-supply offers of 
each other. Information, which reduces uncertainty, .is produced basically 
by buyer search and seller advertising. These activities by buyers and 
sellers-, collectively termed 11 search, 11 provide a- theoretical explanation 
of how markets adjust to equil i crium. Models of market. information 
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can be divided into three different ty.pes: infol"Rlation about price, 
information about quality, and social welfare implications ·of market 
information. 
The traditional microeconomic nx>del assumes that prices· will be 
established and will change in predictable-ways regardless of the existence· 
or extent of imperfect information. Any exogenous shock, such as a change 
in the cost of information or entry of new firms, into the industry, 
sets in motion equilibrating forces that lead toward the competittv·e 
equilibrium price. In contrast, the economics of information models 
suggest that the existence of costly information. may fundamentally change 
the expected outcomes .of a competitive market. -For example, the monopoly 
price.may prevail even in markets with large numbers of small firms 
{e.g., Diamond, 1971; Scitovsky, 1950) 
and prices may be higher in markets with a large number of sellers 
than in markets with fewer sellers (e.g., Salop, 1976; Stiglitz, 1979; 
Satterthwaite, 1979). . . 
Moreover, some economics of information models predict that the 
predominant equilibrium characteristic of competitive markets is· price 
dispersion, not a unique price. By introducing an adju-stment mechanism, 
however, the existence of an equilibrium price dispersion can be explained 
by the traditional theoretical framework in the following way: Although 
the competitive pressures of search and advertising would 1 ead toward .. 
a single price equilibrium, as price differentials narrowed, the gains 
from search and advertising would decline •. Since it is never profitable 
to become perfectly informed in a world of costly·information, an 
equilibrium price distribution for a homogeneous good would obtain at 
the point where the net_ gains from additional information are ·zero. Since 
this equilibrium could be consistent with small or large price dispersion, · 
~owever, this is an issue of some importance. One observer posed' the 
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question this way: Does imperfect information and the friction of · 
disequilibrium make a substantial difference in market outcomes or· does 
it merely account 11for variations in tne numbers we observe at the fifth 
or sixth ·decimal place" (Rothschild, 1973, p. 1283). By assuming specific 
~ehavioral characteristics of buyers and sellers as they search, some 
econoinics of information models predict that, for a variety of reasons~ 
price dispersion in competitive markets may be large and persistent 
(e.g., Salop, 1973; Butters, 1977; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977L · 
This paper concentrates on several aspects of the impact of informati~n 
on market price in the retail discount commission brokerage industry. 
In ·section II, we describe the characteristics ·of the industry and the 
product and,in section III, we .examine the data set and the extent of 
pric.e dispersion in this market. In section IV, we test several hypotheses 
about the effect of market structure on pricing behavior by discount 
brokerage firms. 
II. Industry and Product Characteristics 
There are two reasons why the discount brokerage industry provides 
an interesting case and a· good set of data for studying the. impact of 
informationally imperfect imarkets on prices. First, this industry 
offers a relatively homogeneous product, which reduces the pro bl em of 
adjusting the data for quality differences. Second, since its 
raison ~tre is to offer efficient, low .. cost transactions services, 
discount brokerage firms publish detailed price information on their 
services, which provides a good data set.· 
This segment of the securities industry evolved. as a result of 
legislation that abpl ished the cartel pricing system in 1975. Most 
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retail discount brokerage firms offer a single, relatively standardized . 
product called title. transfer,, which i$ just one par1: of total transactions 
services •1 In the theoretical model of transacting, .oemsetz (1968) 
· 1Full service brokers, such as Merrill Lynch, Bache, and E.F. Hutton, 
al so provide a variety of investment advisory services at no additional 
. charge. ·Thus, their 11brokerage11 commissions, which are substantially 
higher than the di~counters, are actually a combination of fees for title 
transfer services and fees for investment. advisory services •. 
divides transacting into two steps: a liqu:fdity function, provided by 
dealers, and a title transfer function, provided by brokers. The price 
of liquidity, which is the premium paid by persons for "predictable 
immediacy of exchange in organized markets" (Demsetz, pp. 35~36), is · 
measured· by the bid-ask spread. The price of title transfer. is measured 
by brokerage commissions. 2 There may be particular trades in which 
2There are al so minor miscellaneous charges, such as transfer 
taxes and certificate delivery fees. 
a securities firm assumes both deal er and brokerage :activities, but 
they are functions that can be priced separately. 
Although brokerage 11 usually defined as bringing buyer and seller• 
toegether,. it is more accurate to say that generally the broker brings 
buyer and dealer or seller and dealer together. Thus, brokerage.can 
be defined as. an interface service between clients who wish to obtain . 
title transfer services and dealers who perform the execution function. 
Brokers also function as the interface between their clients and transfer 
agents, who handle the actual physical transfer of title. · 
In this study, we assume that brokers are price ta·kers· with respect 
to dealer services, so that ·variations in the quality of execution 
services is· not an explanation fo.r variations in brokerage commissions. 
5 
The pri~e-taker assumption is certainly true for all H111it orders _that 
are placed away from the current market price. And for.market orders, 
the alternative is to assume that brokers either fulfill the dealer 
function themselves, so they have some control over quality, or they are 
particularly adept at negotiating or searching among dealers for the 
best bid-ask prices. If a firm .was able to offer a title transfer 
service that included access to better execution, and if buyers recognized 
this fact, that finn could ·charge ~ .preniu,a .for· this higher quality 
product. 1 Some brokers claim that they can obtain the best price for 
1we are ignoring the potentially more-difficult issues of quality 
perception by buyers, which may be influenced by advertising. 
_clients, presumably by searching for dealers_ with the most favorable 
bid-ask spread. But this fact is virtually imposs·•f bl e for the client 
to verify. Moreover, it is questionable whether, in fact, brokers search. 
The brokerage function itself is 1 imitad to a few relatively . 
standardized items: 
1 . receive, transmit, and confirm title transfer orders; 
2. provide supporting documentation, such as confirmation 
and monthly statements; 
3. handle the payment. and dispersal of money related to trades; 
4. collect and deliver s.ecurities certificates; 
·s. ma11age margin accounts and free credit balances; 
6. provide custodial services. 
Item 1 _ represents ~he brokerage function tha.t facilitates execution 
of the trade. Items 2, 3, and 4 are known collectively as the "cl earing" 
function. Money and certificates change hands- between buyers and se11 ers 
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through thei.r brokers •1 Items 5 a.nd 6 are ancillary services. 
1The s e 111 ng broker de 1i vers the security to the buying · br_oker • . · 
(This is accompUshed on a net trading basis by specialized clearing 
institutions.). The buying broker sends the c~rtificate to the appropriate 
transfer agent (usually a connnercial bank},. who issues a certificate in _ 
the name of the new owner. The certificate is then delivered to the 
new owner .through the buying broker •. 
Discounters and small full service- brokers often contract out one 
or more of itens 2-6 to firms. that have excess capacity to handle these, 
routine chores. For example, the most specialized type of discount 
broker is the so.-call ed "introducing broker," who actually performs 
only one phase of the first function 1 isted above. This type of firm 
receives and transmits orders to another broker who, in turn, directs 
them to dealers. Confirmation is_ then relayed back through the introducing 
broker to the client. One or more of the remaining functions are performed 
by another firm, often a large full service broker like Merrill Lynch 
who, in effect, participates indirectly in the discount brokerage business. 
· In summary, there is no reason to believe that there are significant 
or systenatic differences in the quality of title transfer services 
offered by firms in the retail discount comnission brokerage industry. 
Indeed, the smallest firm could contract with a·highly efficient clearing 
broker for many of its functions and provide a service equal to or better 
in quality than a competitor who is much better. capitalized. The 
product is rendered more homogeneous by the protec1;ion against fraud 
or .mismanagement afforded by: Sl?C insuran~e, which is often suppl enented by 
individua·l firms with private insurance. 
·! 
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UI. Pricing Characteristics 
In this section, we examine the pricing .Characteristics of a sample of discount 
firms. Th~ firms in the sample ·were identified· through a process of · 
searching advertisements in Barron's, _Wall Street Journal, yellow pages 
of telephone directories, and lo.cal newspapers. We obtai.ned price data 
and the characteri stf cs of services o.ffered by 68 fJnris that advertised 
discount commission rates during 1979. These firms had home offices 
or branches in 26 different cities that were geographically separated 
enough to be considered independent local market areas. These markets 
. were located throughout the_ United States. 
Table 1 provides information on mean price, maximum and minimum 
TABLE l 
Selected Stathtics for Discount Brokers 
Trade Mean Minimum Maximum- Coeffi c1ent · -Adj:~- C"oiff.tcient. 
of Variation of Variation* 
200 shrs. @ $20 $ 45 $ 30 . $ 70 19.5% 18.5% 
300 shrs. @ 30 78 37 135 25.4 22.7 
400· shrs. @ 40 113 50 224 29.7 26.1-
500 shrs. @ 50 146 62 290 31 .3 28.2 
* see text for details of adjustment procedures 
price, coefficient of variation, and adjusted coefficient o.f variation 
(discussed below), that where computed from our sample of discount 
. . 
brokers for selected trades. It is evident that a good deal of variation 
exists in the commissions charged for the same trade by discount brokers. 
The coefficients of variation range from 19.5% to-31 .3% and the maximum 




To gain perspective on the significant price dispersion among . 
discount brokers, Table 2 presents similar information for a sample of 
TABLE ;2 
Selected Statistics for Full Service Brokers* 
Trade Mean Minimum Maximum Coeffi.cient·of 
·Variation 
100 shrs. @ $ 31 $ 63 $ 60 $ 66 2.9% 
1000 shrs. @ 8 208 200 225 4. 1 
. 3000 shrs • . @ 17 650 606 679 3.0 
* source: Survey~•by Kennedy1 Cabot -Co. 1979 
full service brokerage firms drawn .from a different sourse •. As 
demonstrated by a compariso·n of the data in· Tables 1 and 2, price 
di_spersion among discount brokers is 4 to 7 times higher than for full 
service brokers. Full service brokers apparently choose to engage in 
nonprice competition through the provision of investment· advisory services, 
which are bundled with title transfer services.1 
1Al though it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine why the 
pricing structure is dramatically differentfor these two segmen1;s of 
the securities ·industry, there ·is one point worth noting. The ·market 
structure of the discount brokerage industry ·is more competitive than the 
full service segment of the industry. The pricing structures of these 
two industries are consistent with Stigler' s (1961 ). proposition regarding 
market structure and price dispersion: .Sfnce price dispersion engenders 
search, and search cost is a cost of goods sold, which reduces quantity 
demanded, firms in industries with monopoly power will find ·;t in their 
collective interest to have 1 ess price dispersion. · 
The data in Table 1, however, may only represent "apparent" rather 
than "real II price dispersion if the amount of .services (i.e., cost ·Of 
, operations) differs among firms. Since the -firms in· our sam-pl e differ 
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to some extent with respect to services offered- in addition to title 
transfer, these data constitute an .upward boundary to the amount of actual 
price dispersion within the industry. In order to obtain a tighter 
fix on the amount of actual price dispersion, we estimated how much of 
-the variation in commission charges could be accounted for by variation 
in the range of ancillary services offered among ffnns. 
We identified three important services that differed among firms: 
.(a) Investment Advisory Services. · Some firms that advertised 
discount brokerage commissions also offered investment advisory services, 
such as individual security and portfolio analysis, buy and sell 
reco11111endati~ns~ and investment newsletters. This service should raise 
their cost of operatfons above those firms· fn the industry that offer 
only title transfer services. Therefore, we ex_pect commission rates 
will be higher for firms that offer investment advisory services. 
(b) Interest Paid on Free. Credit Balances. Some firms-pay interest 
on idle account balances._ These arrangements usually involve the use 
of overnight repurchase agreements with banks or money market mutual _ 
funds. Since this is a level of service beyond title transfer, we 
expect that firms offering this arrangement would. have higher commission 
1 
rates. 
(c) Branch Offices. Most of the firms in- our sample operate from 
a single location, but some .-of them have established branch offices in 
other cities. This service provides clients with more convenient access 
to the firm, but raises the fixed cost of operations. We expect.that 
firms with branch offices wi11 haYe higher commission rates. 
Equation (l) represents the form of the regression estimated to 
1rt is not cl ear that providing this service will actually raise the cos-t 
of operations to the firm, since the firm may rec~ive services in_ kind or 
fees for directing customers balances to a particular bank or mutual fund. 
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account for the foregoing factors: 







COM; a conmission charged by firms for trades fn Table 1 (1 = 1,4);. 
ADV = a dunnny variable with value of 1 ff finn offers investment 
advisory service, otherwise O; 
INT = a. du11111y variable with value of 1 · if firms provide for · · 
interest on free credit ·balances, otherwise O; · 
BR = a dunmy variable wfth·va·lue of 1 if firm operates branch 
offices, otherwise o. 
The results of the regressions. are reported in Table 3. · In general, · 
TABLE3 
Regressions Explaining Commission Levels 
.(t values in parentheses) · . 
INTERCEPT ADV INT BR . R2"'"" 
· 45 .o 5.57 -2.16 4.26 .10 
(28.3)* (1.99)* (0.99) (1.05) 
75 .4 19.95 -4.23 17.73 .20 
(22 .5)* (3.23)*. (0.92) (2.08)* 
109.7 38.5 -9.60 20.15 .23 
(19. 7)* {3.75)* (1.20) ,(L82)* 
142. 8 48.15 -13.19 17.29 .20 
(18.5)* (3. 37)* (1 .23) ( 0 .98). 
significant at .05 level or better 
** adjusted for degrees of freedom 
the coefficients on the variables are of the expected sign, and many 
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. The coefficient 
for the advisory service variable is positive, as expected, and significant 
11 
. in all of the equations~ The coefficients for the branching vari.abl e 
al so have the .expected positive signs and are significant in two of the 
four equa-tions. Finally, the coefficient for the interest rate variable 
is negative, _but 1s· not significant in any of· the· equations. 
I 
Most important for present purposes 1s the amount of observed price 
dispersion that can be accounted for by the differences in firm characteristics • 
. The residual variance left unexplained by the regression is given by 
(1 - R
2
), wher~ R2 is the coefficient .of determination of the regression 
equation. Thus, the percentage reduction in the standard error due to 
the regression -can be calculated as l - ~ (1 - R2). Applying this adjustment 
factor to each of the trades 1 isted in Table l yielded the adjusted 
coefficients of variation given in column 5 of that Table. While speci fie 
firm characteristics account for some of the variation in prices among 
discount brokers, substantial price dispersion remains even after adjustment. 
The preceding analysis implicitly assumed that the market for 
discount brokerage services is national fn scope. But if the relevant 
market 1s local, then some of the observed price dispersion may reflect 
differences in spatially separated markets that are not arbitraged away. 
While, in principle, there is nothing to prevent a client from dealing 
with a broker in any area of the country (most firms offer free WATS 
service), there are reasons to believe that, to some extent, the relevant 
market for brokerage services is. local. First, the existence of branching 
by some discount brokers suggests that these firms believe it is important 
to have offices close to the potential customer base. Second, clients 
may prefer to deal with local brokers to take advantage of such facilities. 
as stock quotation machines and 1 ibrary materials that are provided 
in the broker's office. Finally, .c.1 ients may feel that dealing with a 
local broker will expedite the solut.ion to any problems that arise, 
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such as incorrect execution or- errors on monthly statements. 
In order to investigate the impact of ·geographical differences on 
the observed 1 evel of price dispersion, the _firms and branch offices 
. . . 
were sorted .by location of the city fn which they operated. Since 
the firms that offer investment advisory services were found to have ' 
significantly different prices from those that do not, they were dropped 
from· the sample. - Then, for each city location, the mean price and 
coefficient of variation were calculated within the c.ity for various 
trades. The results of these cal cul at ions are presented in Table 4. 
It is evident that, even within individual cities, substa·ntial variation 
still reriains for -comm-issions charged for the same transaction. We 
conclude that the price dispersion observ·ed for the complete s~mpl e is 
not simply a statistical artifact of spatially separated market$. 
·1v. Information, Competition, and Prices 
The analysis so far has indicated that a substantial amount of 
price dispersion exists for co11111ission charges of discount brokers. -
Since "price dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it is· the 
measure--of ignorance in the market (Stigler, 1961, p. 214), we conclude 
that the discount brokerage industry is characterized by imper-feet 
buyer information. We now turn to a test of some of the hypotheses 
about the role of competition under conditions· of imperfect information. 
Standard microeconomic theory general 1 y associates price competition 
with the number of firms in an industry. Increases in th_e number of 
firms through entry is expected to lower the industry equilibrium price . 
. Under conditions of costly or imperfect information, however, this_ 
conclusion does not necessarily obtain; increases in the number of 
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TABLE 4 . 
~ 
Mean Price Co~fffc1~nt of_ Variation :· 
COM2 COM3 COM4 
- . 
COMS COM2 COM3 COM4 COMS 
New York · 19. l 27.8_ 30.9 32.2 $42 $70 - $102 . $128 
Boston· 17.8 31.1 43.3 53.5 43 65 91 125 
Phi 1 adel phi a 6.0 _ 13.3 15.0 18.7 51 88 ·11.30 175 
Washington D.C. 8.3 6.0 17 .1 24 •. 2 · 51 94 136 181 
Houston a.a· a.a -· 10.1 17 .5 48 89 106 133 
Rochester 3.0 4.9· 5.3 5.9 54 l 01 159 203 
Chicago 12. 3 15.3 22.2 27 .3 . 44 79 106 140 · 
· - St Louis 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 ·so 75 100 -110 _ 
Cleveland 24.6 23.6 _ 23.S 12.6 46 90 1_41 179 
Cincinnati 10.2 _ 3.2 18.5 29.5 62 110 156 ·202 
Miami 16.4 11.T 16.0 27.7 47 - .:.:. ·82 120 150 
Memphis 13.5 7.2 0.0 0.0 42 79 118 163 
Atlanta 24.6 18.8 18.3 18.5 46 86 135 187 
San Franci sea 13.5 12.3 21.6 19.3 48 91 127 - 157 
Los Angeles 7.5 9.9 14.2. 16.5 46 87 110 143 
Phoenix 6.9 9.5 29.3 25.4 50 95 126 · 154 
Dallas a.a 0.8 18.7 17.5 48 89 106 133 
. I 
firms within _the industry mayac:t to raise rather than lower the 
equilibrium price •. 
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This seemingly paradoxical conclusion arises· because of the interaction 
between the number of firms. and the efficiency o.f search (Sal op~ 1976; 
Satterthwaite, 1979). More specifically, an increase in-the .number of 
firms acts to increase the effective search cost. of buyers. _·If buyers 
search in a·n optimal fashion, then an increase in the.·cost of search. 
wil 1 result in a reduction in the amount of search undertaken. The 
effect of Jess buyer search is to reduce· the el a·sticity of .demand facing 
the individual firm, which implies a higher equilibrium price •.. Thus, 
. increases in the number of firms has two counterveil ing effects:- th_e 
usual effect of increasing consumer choice and. reducing prices, and the 
effect of reduced information on the elasticity of firm demand •. Therefore, 
"the net effect of increased competition may b~ either to raise or lower 
prices 1' (Sal op, 1976, _p. 245). 
An empirical test of these propositions can be made within the 
context of pricing in the discount brokerage industry. If increases 
in the number of firms increases effective search cost and reduces the 
intensity of search, then markets with larger numbers of firms should 
exhibit greater amounts of price dispersion. In addition, if the effects 
of increased search cost outweigh the normal effects of entry, then mean 
prices should -be higher in markets that have greater numbers of firms. 
In order to test these proposition_s, we examine the relationship 
between the number of firms within each city in our sample and the 
resulting coefficient of variation of prices and mean price. ·The 
coefficient of variation is taken to measure the intensity of search, 





The mean price is taken to measure the equilibrium·price 
1
It is important to note that we are working with quoted prices 
rather than transaction.prices. While, as Rothschild (1974, p. 692) 
notes. "It should turn out in most sensible models that increased ·search 
activity w111 · decrease price dispersion," o.ur statement is .not on as 
theoretically sol id g"unds as the proposition that increased search 
from an unchanging distribution of prices lowers the mean and variat'ion 
of transaction prices. · 
within each city. 
Table 5 presents the results far regression equations across cities 
TABLE 5 
_Regressions for Price D.ispersion A~ross 
(t values in 
INTERCEPT NFR 
CVC0M2 16.8 .46 
· (5 .87}* (1.99)* 
CVC0M3 14.8 .-87 
(4.60) {3.28)* 
CVC0M4 17.8iil .76 
(3.59)* (1.80)* 
CVC0MS 18.6 .84 
(3.04)* (1.67) 
*significant at .• 05 level or better 

















in which the dependent variahl e is the city 1 s· coefficient of variation · 
of prices (CVCOM). The equation contains two independent variables. 
The first is the number of firms operating -~ithin the city (NFR). If 
increases in the number of firms does result in higher search cost and 
1 ess. intensity of search, then the coefficient for this variable ought 
to be positive. The second variable is an .index ·to reflect the similarity 
.. 
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of firms within each city with respect to the branching characteristic 
(SIMBR). · Since firms with branch offices were previously found to 
typically charge higher prices, some of the variation in prices within 
cities could be attributable to differing mixes of branch and non-
branching firms. The index is designed to vary between zero and one 
hundred. It reaches its. maximum value when all the firms within.a. city 
are identical with respect to the bra-nching characteristic (i.e., none 
of the firms are branch.firms or all of the firms a·re branch firms). 
It reaches a value of zero when there is maximum dis-similarity of firms 
with respect to branching (i.e., 50% of the firms are branch firms and 
. soi are not). Since the greater the similarity of firms with respect 
to branching the less dispersion we expect, the coefficient for this 
. 1 
variable should be negative. 
1specifically, this variable is calculated as two times the absolute 
va 1 ue of 50 mi nus the percentage of firms that are branches. 
The results shown in Ta·bl e 5 conform to the theoretical expectations_ 
of some economics of information models. The coefficient for the number 
of firms variable is positive and significant at the 5% 1 evel or better 
in three of the four equations. The coefficient for the similarity of 
branching is always negative~ as expected, and is significant in two of 
the four equations. These results are consistent with the notion that 
increases in the number of firms raises effective search cost and reduces 
the intensity of search. 
Does this imply that the net effect of increasing competition is 
to raise· mean prices? Table 6 presents regression equations across 
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cities in which the city's mean price fs the dependent variable (MCOM). 
TABLE 6 
Regressions for Mean Prices Across- Cities : 
(t values in parentheses) 
INTERCEPT NFR PERBR 
MCOM2 48.6 --r287 .017 
(25.7)* n·: 76)* {0.80) 
MCOM3 81.8 -.525 .123 
(23.,5)* {1 .85)* {2.98)* 
MCOMf 118.6 -.877 .141 
(15.1)* (1 ._27) (1.52} 
MCOMS 151.9 -1.172 .207 
(12.0)* (0.97} ( 1. 39) 
--·- ,,.,_ .. _ -~-- . -" -~-- ·-· 
* significant at .05 level or better 




. , a 
Each equation. contains two -independent variables. The first variable 
is the number of firms operating within -each city. If price competition 
is actually impaired by large numbers of firms, then the coefficient 
for this variable ought to be positive. The second variable is the 
percentage of firms within each city that are branching firms (PERBR). 
Since branch:fng firms have· higher prices in general, it is expected that 
the greater the percentage of firms in a city that are branches, the 
higher will be that city's mean prices. 
The results shown in Table 6 give no indication that the net effect 
of increased competition is to raise rather than lower prices. The 
coefficients on the number of firms variable are consistently negative 
and significant in two of the four equations. The effects of competition 
18 
predicted by standar~ microeconomic theory seem to .obtain.· The branching 
variable is positive, as expected,. but is significant in only one of 
the four equations. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the pricing behavior of discount · 
brokerage firms. One striki.ng characteristic of this indus.try i.s 
the significant amount of pr;-ce dispersion that exists for commissions 
charged for identical transactions. The fact that this cannot be 
be explained by differences in the service offerings of finns or 
imperfectly·arbitraged spatial markets suggests that this is an 
information based phenomenom. Using th·e observed price dispersion 
within cities as a measure .of· the degree of consumer ignorance several 
hypotheses about the fnteracti on of information and competition were 
exami ned. The res u 1 ts obtained a re· consistent wi th the theo reti ca 1 
notion that competition (as measured by numbers of f.irms) increases 
effective search cost and reduces the intensity of search. Nonetheless, 
the net effect of increased competition was found to lowe.r rather than 
raise prices. 
The results of this study of course must be considered tentative. 
Not all aspects of the consumer information acquisitfun process- were 
taken into account nor the behavior of sellers in providing information 
(e.g,, advertising). Despite these shortcomings, the results presented 
here suggest that i nfonnation does play a quantitatively important role 
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